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CS
0697-02
GENERALS VERSUS THE
PRESIDENT:
Eisenhower and the Army, 1953-1955
A. J. Bacevich and Lawrence F.
Kaplan
In The Soldier and the
State, Samuel P. Huntington asks: “What does the
military officer do when he is ordered by a statesman to
take a measure which is militarily absurd when judged by
professional standards and which is strictly within the
military realm without political implications?” In
Huntington's view, the answer is clear: given such a “clear
invasion of the professional realm by extraneous
considerations…the existence of professional standards
justifies military disobedience.”
Between the autumn of 1953 and
the summer of 1955, the leaders of the United States Army
struggled against a national security policy they thought
flawed, dangerous, and even immoral. In opposing the
strategy of massive retaliation, senior Army leaders placed
themselves at cross purposes with the President of the
United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower. This case is the story
of that conflict. It describes the basis of the Army’s
opposition to Eisenhower’s policies and the means by which
Army leaders chose to advance their position. It also
describes the response by civilian leaders determined to
prevail in a controversy that touches on core issues of
civilian control: What are the proper limits of dissention
by military professionals? How should they express
dissent? What, if any, alternatives do senior officers have
if their views on policy issues of fundamental importance
are disregarded?
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CS 1197-03
PEACEKEEPING IN BOSNIA
William C. Banks and Jeffrey D.
Straussman
In August 1995, President
Clinton’s Balkan strategy suddenly seemed vindicated.
Within days of Congress voting with veto-proof majority to
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, the Croatian government
launched an offensive against its dissident Serbian
minority. Neither the Serb government in Belgrade nor
Western nations responded, even though the Croatian
operation was similar to the “ethnic cleansing” that the
Serbs had earlier committed. When the Serbs continued to
attack Muslim military positions in Sarajevo, President
Clinton authorized air strikes against the Serbs. This
blunted Congress’s drive to override President Clinton’s
earlier veto on lifting the arms embargo and effectively
brought the warring sides in Bosnia to the bargaining table.
As regional conflicts, ethnic
strife, and humanitarian emergencies have mushroomed in the
1990s, the U.S. has provided leadership and resources in
these emergent conflict situations. The U.S. commitment to
a major peace operation in Bosnia serves to illustrate the
evolving complexities of the executive/legislative
relationship in national security. This case assesses
several critical aspects of this relationship: (1) the
application of the Constitution’s war powers to contemporary
military operations; (2) the effects of the multilateral
operation on U.S. involvement; and (3) Congress’ power of
the purse and the President’s spending discretion.
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CS
1197-04
THE BATTLE TO DESTROY
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
W. Henry Lambright
In September 1985, Congress
approved funds for a new program in chemical weapons
development and production, at the same time mandating that
the existing stockpile of aging and, in some cases, obsolete
weapons be destroyed by 1994. As of today, the initial
deadline of 1994 has slipped to a congressionally mandated
2004, a date that most observers expect to slip considerably
more. The budget for stockpile destruction is projected to
be $12.4 billion, immensely more than the original estimate
of $1.7 billion.
The case focuses on the
administrative leadership of the four assistant secretaries
with primary responsibilities for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program between 1985 and 1997. Leadership
issues include the level of organization appropriate to be
in charge of this program, relations with other agencies and
Congress, strategies of implementation, the impact of
Presidential policy on administrative efficiency, and the
role of the Army in dealing with highly politicized issues
involving local citizens. In addition, the case tackles
questions of technological and environmental risk and of
relations within the DOD among generalist political
appointees, military professionals, and technical experts.
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CS
1197-05
BREAKING THE MARKET OR
PREVENTING
MARKET BREAKDOWN: The Technology Reinvestment Project
Sean O’Keefe and Volker Franke
In October 1994, the federal
government awarded $200 million in federal matching funds
from the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) to integrate
selected commercial and defense R&D into a single,
leading-edge technology and industrial base to promote
economic growth while developing national security
technology. TRP quickly became the Clinton Administration’s
signature project for smoothing the transition for the
post-Cold War defense industry and for developing dual-use
defense technology through collaborative efforts between
industry, government, and academia, all of which shared
know-how, skills, and costs. From its inception in 1993,
TRP faced enormous criticism from both sides of the
political spectrum. Economic conservatives viewed the
program as an economy-distorting federal intervention in the
private sector. Defense conversion advocates argued TRP
subsidies were too small and criticized the project focused
too much on “defense reinvestment” at the expense of
creating jobs for laid-off defense industry workers.
This case illustrates the
controversy over TRP and, more generally, raises questions
about the viability of governmental market intervention: How
can the U.S. stay militarily superior and economically
competitive in the face of uncertain threats, growing fiscal
constraints, and revolutionary changes in technology?
Should government become involved in the market for the sake
of strengthening national security? If so, to what extent
and where? Who decides which projects are in the interest
of national security?
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CS
1197-06
OBLIGATIONS OF LEADERSHIP:
The Khobar Towers Bombing and its Aftermath
Eliot A. Cohen
On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb
exploded at the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia, leaving 19 American military personnel dead
and injuring hundreds of people from several nations. The
bombing resulted in immediate finger-pointing between
members of Congress, the Department of Defense, and the U.S.
Air Force. This case illustrates the events and their
aftermath and explores the nature of accountability and
leadership in the United States military. By implication,
the events described also raise questions about
civil-military relations, the strategic challenges of the
post-Cold War era, and the nature of service culture.
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CS
0398-07
FROM TURBULENCE TO TRAGEDY:
The Crash of Ron Brown’s Flight in Croatia
Patricia Ingraham and Barbara
Romzek
On April 3, 1996, Secretary of
Commerce Ron Brown and 33 others were killed when their
plane descended off course and crashed into a mountainside.
In retrospect, some of the reasons for the tragic accident
are clear. In part, the plane crashed as a result of
individual errors. But, institutional conditions also
played a role, including political and military
circumstances surrounding the Secretary’s mission.
Inevitably, questions remain: what accounted for the
combination of errors at Dubrovnik and who is to blame for
an accident that should have been avoided?
This case highlights the
challenge military officers face as they seek to demonstrate
initiative and leadership in a time of mission shift, high
tempo operations, heightened political scrutiny, and
declining resources. Questions raised by the case include
whether and to what extent institutional systems of
decision-making, reporting, and staff development contribute
to mistakes and mishaps, and what adjustments are needed to
reduce the probability of future tragedies.
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CS 1298-11
SEARCHING FOR A SAFER TECHNOLOGY:
Army-Community Conflict in Chemical Weapons Destruction
W. Henry Lambright
Welcome to “Dialogue!”—A new
form of participatory decision-making for Department of
Defense and the Army, a product of post-Cold War
environmentalism, aimed at ending a logjam in chemical
weapons destruction. In what was seen as a major foreign
policy victory by the Clinton Administration, Congress in
1997 ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The
subsequent problem was to implement this treaty. The U.S.
promised to destroy its stockpile of 30,000 tons of chemical
weapons, located at eight continental sites and a remote
South Pacific atoll, by 2007. The treaty reinforced a 1985
legislative mandate to dismantle such weapons. There had
been earlier deadlines, all missed.
This case examines the
challenges of compliance with the 1997 CWC. It tackles
issues relating to safety of alternative technology
programs, public trust in government, Army public relations
and strategies to handle opposition, and the role of science
and citizen concerns in formulating policy objectives,
assessing risks, and accommodating vastly different
interests.
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CS 0699-12
“TO PREVENT AND DETER”
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
The U.S. Response to the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy Bombings
William C. Banks
On August 7, 1998 President
Clinton received a pre-dawn wake-up call from National
Security Adviser Samuel R. “Sandy” Berger, informing him of
terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam. On August 20, retaliatory strikes were launched
at targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. The strikes were the
product of a tightly controlled decision process, by a
handful of officials. Although the U.S. acted quickly and
firmly, questions and criticisms arose early on. What was
the decision process? Was the decision to respond with
military force effective? Were the strikes lawful? Will
the strikes serve the purpose of deterring further acts of
international terrorism?
This case raises a number of
questions that are central to U.S. national security
decision making options for the future: What are the
domestic and international legal considerations in deciding
whether and how to respond to acts of international
terrorism? To what extent must the Congress be involved and
what discretion does the Commander in Chief have to act on
his own? Legal considerations aside, does the use of force
as an instrument of counterterrorism policy pay off? Can
the war against international terrorism be won through
military means?
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CS 0699-13
ROTATION FROM HELL: The 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia
Army National Guard in Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Eliot A. Cohen
As the United States began
mobilizing its forces for deployment to the Persian Gulf in
the fall of 1990, one critical question was what would
happen with the reserves. It was understood that
reservists would be needed in many capacities, but would
they play a major role in ground combat? The 48th Georgia
Army National Guard brigade was an obvious candidate for a
prominent role in the battle. It was a roundout brigade of
the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, a full third of that
unit's maneuver force. Previous commanders of the 24th
(including then-Major General Norman Schwartzkopf) had
insisted that when the division went to war, the 48th would
go along with it. Eventually, the 48th was mobilized, but
it never got to the Gulf, much less to the battle area.
Instead a prolonged, exhausting, and humiliating period of
training ensued at both home station and the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The senior
leadership of the U.S. Army judged that it was simply not
ready. How had this happened? The 48th was perhaps the
highest priority heavy force in the Army National Guard, and
had been identified as such publicly.
The case examines the decision
to mobilize the 48th, and then to keep it stateside, as well
as the furor that then ensued. The case explores the
management of active-reserve relations, and in particular
the gap (not unique to this case) between declaratory policy
and real belief. Readers get a sense of how active/reserve
relations can go awry and what can/should be done to manage,
correct, or rescue them. In addition, this case presents an
opportunity to reflect on the role of the citizen soldier in
a new era of war.
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CS 0899-14
CHANGING COURSE:
Admiral Watkins and the DOE Nuclear Complex
W. Henry Lambright
Admiral James Watkins, recently
appointed as Secretary of Energy, was shocked to learn that
the FBI and EPA planned a surprise raid on Rocky Flats, a
Department of Energy (DOE) facility near Denver, Colorado,
responsible for plutonium triggers in nuclear weapons. The
FBI and EPA believed Rocky Flats had violated environmental
laws in its disposal of dangerous nuclear materials.
Watkins feared that if the FBI and EPA tried to force their
way into the heavily secured facility, they would provoke a
confrontation with the DOE guards and contractor who might
mistake them as terrorists. The Rocky Flats raid was but
the most dramatic of a number of events concerning
conditions at DOE weapons facilities. Watkins found himself
in charge of a nuclear time-bomb in which a disaster, real
or perceived, could take place at any moment.
This case is a study of a
strong personality in a setting of dramatic change. It
illuminates not only the possibilities of leadership but
also its limits in the American system of government. The
case tells the story of how former Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral James Watkins, President Bush’s
appointee as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE),
sought to make his agency more sensitive to its safety and
environmental responsibilities. The case examines how
Secretary Watkins coped with downsizing DOE’s defense
mission as the Cold War ended while enlarging its
environmental mission. When he came into office in 1989,
the nation’s capacity to build nuclear weapons had been shut
down due to safety and environmental problems. He had to
take an organization that had always put production first,
and make safety and environment co-equal values. This
entailed cultural change of the sprawling nuclear weapons
complex. Then, the Cold War ended and he had to downsize
the defense mission of DOE even as he attempted to maintain
that capacity. At the same time, he had to build a new
environmental clean-up mission virtually from scratch.
Everything he did was subject to debate from all sides, and
conducted in a media spotlight.
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CS 1299-16
THE UN-NATO COALITION:
Diplomatic and Military Interaction in Bosnia
Thomas A. Keaney and Scott
Douglas
In November 1994, Lieutenant
General Michael Ryan, NATO air commander in Southern Europe,
organized what was at the time the largest bombing raid in
Europe since the end of World War II. The target, an
airfield in Croatia, served as a launching base for Serb
aircraft conducting bombing raids into Bosnia. Ryan’s task,
however, was not to make war on Croatia or on the Serbs, but
to support United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. As
a result, he had to limit the effects of his attack so as
not to hinder diplomatic efforts then underway or compromise
the neutrality of the UN forces on the ground. Ryan himself
reported through NATO channels ultimately to political
authorities in Brussels, Belgium. The UN forces he supported
traced their command channels back to UN headquarters in New
York. Ryan, an American, commanded mainly U.S. air forces,
but his UN peacekeeping force did not include Americans—the
United States had refused to take part in this peacekeeping
effort. It had taken more than two years to reach a point
at which NATO and UN forces could act in coordination to
enforce violations of the UN resolutions. The attack on the
Croatian airfield was a test of the partnership.
The case examines the political
and military actions taken in Bosnia by UN, NATO, and U.S.
participants as they attempted to balance negotiations with
the use of military force. It exemplifies the difficulties
involved in managing peace operations, particularly those
requiring coordination among multinational organizations.
The case discusses the command and control difficulties
involved in coalition operations, raises awareness of the
complex relationship of force and diplomacy faced by
military forces deployed in peace operations, and provides
an understanding of the pitfalls endemic in such
circumstances.
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CS
0500-17
“GUARANTEEING” PEACE
AGREEMENTS:
The U.S. in the Peru-Ecuador Border Dispute
Theodore S. Wilkinson
Latin America’s oldest and most
significant remaining border dispute between Peru and
Ecuador erupted once again in January 1995, only weeks after
the much-heralded December 1994 Summit Meeting of the
Americas that had been called together by President Clinton
in Miami. When the fighting persisted, the U.S., along with
Brazil, Argentina and Chile, was called into action to help
bring it to an end. To achieve a cease-fire, the U.S. and
Latin American guarantors were asked to promise an observer
force for the area of border hostilities. Responsibility for
the force would fall heavily on the U.S. Department of
Defense; the disputed region was inaccessible and virtually
uninhabited, and observers would depend on Cincsouth for
logistics and helicopters.
The case examines the policy
pros and cons that had to be weighed in Washington in early
1995 before taking on any new peacekeeping adventure,
bearing in mind recent American experience in Somalia and
U.S. legislative resistance to the deployment of U.S. forces
to Bosnia. The case reviews the guarantors’ joint decision
on the observer force and discusses the difficulties in
getting Peru and Ecuador to negotiate and reach an
agreement. The case illustrates several policy dilemmas
faced by the U.S.: weighing the costs of sending an observer
force against the risks of inaction; orchestrating the four
guarantor nations to act in harmony so as to bring pressure
on Peru and Ecuador to negotiate and settle; and finding the
right mix of political and economic incentives to convince
reluctant nationalists on both sides of the dispute to
accept the compromise settlement that Presidents Fujimori
and Mahuad finally signed on November 2, 1998.
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CS 0600-18
SCOTT RITTER V. SADDAM
HUSSEIN:
The Crisis over UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq
David Wise
In September 1998, when he
resigned as a United Nations weapons inspector, Scott Ritter
was under investigation for espionage. Ritter had been
working closely with the CIA in a top-secret spy operation
that listened in on conversations of senior Iraqi officials
to find out where Saddam Hussein was hiding chemical or
biological weapons or components for a nuclear bomb. Ritter
had also shared secret CIA U-2 photographs of Iraq with
Israel, which led CIA security officials to worry that he
might be spying for that country—even though Ritter says he
acted with the permission of his UN superior. The CIA had
provided the U-2 photos to UNSCOM to assist the UN agency in
its mission. As a result, U.S. information, although
classified, was made available to an agency comprised of all
21 member nations of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM),
including Russia and China.
This case examines aspects of
the failed UNSCOM mission to carry out the mandate of the UN
Security Council to find, remove, destroy, or render
harmless Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. It centers in
particular on the efforts of one American inspector, William
Scott Ritter, Jr. to focus world attention on Iraq’s
defiance of the United Nations. Policy questions raised by
this case include: What are the risks to the United Nations
of the UN calling on the intelligence resources of member
states to assist it? What are the costs/benefits of
employing covert action (e.g., CIA eavesdropping on Iraq)
when overt means (e.g., UNSCOM’s weapons inspection) fail to
yield desired results? Should an intelligence agency such
as the CIA make classified information available to a UN
body composed of many, diverse member nations? Can it still
hope to restrict dissemination of the material? What, if
anything, went wrong in the U.S.-UN relationship? What
lessons can be drawn from the UNSCOM experience for future
multinational, UN-led operations?
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CS
0700-19
A FIRM AND COMMENSURATE
RESPONSE:
U.S. Retaliation for the Bush Assassination Attempt
A. J. Bacevich
Late on the night of April 13,
1993, two vehicles carrying a total of ten passengers —all
Iraqi citizens—weapons, ammunition, and explosives arrived
at the outskirts of Kuwait City on a deadly mission: to
assassinate former U.S. President George Bush on his
forthcoming visit to Kuwait. To the assassins’ dismay the
daring plot unraveled before it got fully underway. The
ringleaders were arrested by Kuwaiti authorities and Mr.
Bush departed Kuwait without incident. Following an
independent CIA investigation that had concluded that the
assassination plot had originated in Baghdad, the Clinton
Administration authorized retaliatory measures to persuade
Saddam Hussein that “such behavior is unacceptable.” On
June 26, U.S. forces launched a total of 23 cruise missiles
against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service
in downtown Baghdad. In a television address shortly after
the attack, President Clinton characterized the attack as “a
firm and commensurate response” that would “send a message”
to any would-be source of state-sponsored terrorism, deter
any future assassination attempts, and “affirm the
expectation of civilized behavior among nations.”
The case examines the Clinton
Administration’s response to Iraq’s attempted assassination
of former President Bush and explores the interaction
between senior civilian and military officials that shaped
the military options presented to the President. Questions
raised by this case include: To what degree did the “right”
factors receive the attention they deserved? Was the attack
a success or a failure? Was the civil-military relationship
effective? How should the concept of “proportionality”
figure in considering the use of force in situations short
of full-scale war?
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CS
0900-20
BURNED BY THE PRESS:
One Commander’s Experience
Richard J. Newman
When U.S. Army troops deployed
to Bosnia late in 1995, there were about two dozen news
reporters “embedded” with various units—essentially, living
and traveling with them. Commanders decided that embedding
reporters with units would help get the Army’s story out,
generate support for the mission among the American public,
and enhance the morale of the soldiers. But inevitably,
some stories also produced controversy. A front-page story
in the Wall Street Journal in December 1995 quoted Col. Greg
Fontenot, commander of the lead brigade, making a number of
highly controversial statements. The story produced
discomfort for U.S. officials and the Army hastily conducted
an official investigation, casting a cloud of doubt around a
popular commander in the midst of an operation and
disrupting the rhythm of the deployment. Although Fontenot
was ultimately cleared, he was passed over for promotion to
brigadier general, despite the fact that he had been widely
viewed as one of the most capable colonels in the Army.
While it may never be known whether the controversial
publicity produced by the Journal article influenced the
Army’s decision not to promote Fontenot, the widespread
impression among soldiers is that the Army “punished”
Fontenot for producing bad press by effectively cutting his
career short.
This case examines the Fontenot
incident in detail, documenting how a commander’s seemingly
innocent remarks became the subject of a career-threatening
investigation. It also explores how senior officials in the
theater of operations, at command headquarters in Germany,
and in Washington affected the outcome. The case analyzes
one of the central dilemmas officers face when deciding
whether, and how, to deal with the press: any benefit
(positive publicity) tends to accrue to the military as an
institution, while the risk (negative publicity) is borne
largely by the individual officer. Ultimately, the case
study asks how officers can minimize personal risk when
dealing with the press.
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CS 0901-23
WORSE THAN AN INFECTION?:
DOD’s Struggle with the Anthrax Vaccination
John Robinson
Until recently, Capt. Clifton
Volpe was a model pilot for the Air Force who consistently
received high marks from his commanders. That all changed
when he refused a direct order to take a vaccination against
anthrax in preparation for a deployment to the Persian
Gulf. Although Volpe was only the second active duty pilot
to be discharged from service for refusing the shot, his
case represents an important flash point in a lingering
problem for DOD leaders. DOD estimates only 350 personnel
have been discharged for refusing to take the vaccine.
However, some of those discharged, like Volpe, are pilots—a
community that is a precious commodity in these days of
far-flung deployments.
This case highlights the unique
challenge confronting the DOD for carrying out an effective
plan to protect its forces against the threat of biological
warfare without diminishing readiness. In addition, the
anthrax vaccination plan has sparked an active resistance
movement in the ranks, raising questions about the
Pentagon’s leadership and about the mistrust of the military
leadership by rank and file personnel. An overriding
concern, and perhaps much deeper challenge, however, is the
open questioning of military orders—something that tears at
the very fabric of the institution.
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CS
1201-24
SECURITY AND SALVATION:
Bringing Russia aboard the Space Station
W. Henry Lambright
As the Clinton Administration
took power in January and February 1993, national security
officials became aware that the Russians were about to
transfer rocket technology to India, a move fraught with
missile proliferation peril. However, instead of imposing
trade sanctions to punish Russia, the Clinton Administration
decided to bring Russia aboard the International Space
Station. This decision marked a turning point of historic
significance for space policy. Born out of Cold War rivalry
the Space Station now came to symbolize post-Cold War
cooperation. Integrating Russia “securitized” the Space
Station, linking post Cold War foreign policy, Big Science
and geopolitics and aided NASA at a critical moment to gain
funding to keep the program alive.
This case outlines the sequence
of decisions that lead to the development of the
International Space Station which has emerged as a prime
model for large-scale cooperation across nations in science
and technology. Decision-making constituted coalition
building and it took much time to assemble a “winning”
coalition. Whether successful in the end, the story of the
International Space Station provides invaluable lessons
about the dynamics of post-Cold War cooperation and the era
of globalization. The case illustrates these lessons and
the tension between U.S. control of a program and deference
to other sovereign nations and their claims.
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CS
0102-25
SEPARATE POWERS:
The Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998
Laurence Pope
In early 1998, the Clinton
Administration was under pressure. Its covert support of
mainly Kurdish Iraqi opposition groups based in northern
Iraq under the banner of the Iraqi National Congress had
collapsed in 1996 after an attempt by the INC to coordinate
an offensive against the Iraqi Army ended in a rout, and the
imprisonment of hundreds, perhaps thousands, inside Saddam
Hussein’s gulag and torture machine. This case is the
account of legislation adopted during this period, the Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998. Opposed by the bureaucracy at
State, Defense, CIA, and the NSC staff, the ILA was signed
into law by President Clinton on October 31, 1998, at one of
the weakest moments in his presidency. Without reference to
UN Security Council Resolutions which had been the
underpinning of international efforts since the 1990
invasion of Kuwait, the ILA committed the United States to a
policy of seeking the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.
This case examines the Clinton
Administration’s (and to some extent the current Bush
Administration’s) response to the Iraq Liberation Act of
1998. The ILA, which remains on the books, declares it to
be U.S. policy to seek the removal of the regime of Saddam
Hussein. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, the question of whether action should be
undertaken to affect the removal of that regime continues to
be debated. That larger debate is not the issue here. The
case focuses rather on a particular attempt to legislate
foreign policy and is intended as a vehicle for exploring
the difficulties created by such legislative mandates for
the women and men of the executive branch.
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CS 0998-09
FOUR DAYS IN DECEMBER
L. Paul Dube
It is December, about
three weeks after a Presidential election. In a stunning
political upset, the American people cast an impressive
majority of their votes for a third party candidate who
defied virtually every tenet of conventional wisdom about
campaigning for the presidency. Confounding the pundits and
pollsters, her campaign succeeded in convincing the American
people that values were more important than promises and
that the two major parties were more likely to serve
specific interest groups than basic American values, which
she identified only in the broadest of terms.
Exercise participants are
assigned to the President(elect)’s transition staff and
tasked to advise the President(elect) whether and how her
predecessor’s Defense program should be revised. The
exercise is designed to allow and force participants to
deliberate the fundamental strategy, policy, and resource
underpinnings of the Defense program. Participants, divided
into teams, are tasked to establish and articulate the
strategy and policy premises of the Defense program that
they would recommend to a new President, along with the
force levels, programs and resources required to carry it
out. Participants must organize themselves, develop a
process, assign responsibilities, make judgments about time
allocation and sequence of events required.
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CS
0299-101
NATIONLAND
James Blandin and Sean O’Keefe
Nationland faces some difficult
budget and defense policy choices. Nationland, a relatively
mature democracy, is currently experiencing rapid economic
growth and becoming more productive as market oriented
reforms take hold. In the near future Nationland is
expected to be a significant player in the global economy.
However, not everyone has benefited equally from rapid
economic growth. Unemployment is growing in the country as
the government eliminated state subsidies from unproductive
enterprises. As these bankruptcies grow—an inevitable part
of the economic transformation—the government must decide
how much social protection to provide for those who are left
behind Nationland’s “economic miracle.” Given this
environment, the leaders of Nationland must establish firm
priorities between defense and non-defense spending and
decide which programs deserve the most resources.
Exercise participants, assigned
to presidential senior national security working groups,
will review the national security function of the
government, establish a national security policy and
determine the proper roles, missions and functions of the
armed forces. Next, the groups will determine how important
defense spending is compared to other national needs.
Finally, the groups will decide how to structure
Nationland’s defense budget and how to allocate funds
consistent with its policy and strategy objectives.
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CS
1000-21
ESCALATING THE WAR IN
VIETNAM:
A Simulation of the July 1965 Deliberations
Thomas A. Keaney
In July 1965, nearly a year
after the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the situation in South
Vietnam has continued to deteriorate despite the build up of
U.S. advisors to the South Vietnamese military and the
commencement of bombing of the North. Instead, more
territory has been lost to the Viet Cong insurgents, and a
series of government changes have further destabilized the
South Vietnamese regime. President Lyndon Johnson and
senior U.S. decision-makers face crucial decisions in their
attempts to develop a strategy for dealing with the
worsening situation in South Vietnam and for assessing U.S.
military activities in the South and for the bombing
campaign over the North.
This exercise simulates a
meeting of members of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC)
in July 1965, assembled to discuss and provide
recommendations to the President on U.S. policy in Vietnam.
Participants play the role of principals in these
deliberations and formulate their own positions regarding
future national security objectives, resources, and
strategy, including the deployment of additional military
troops, employment of those forces in a direct combat role,
the bombing of North Vietnam, and so forth. The exercise
does not reflect an actual meeting of July 1965. Instead,
it reflects a series of meetings during the period that
involved many of the principals played in the exercise.
In preparation for these
deliberations, participants have reference to actual
memoranda, reports, and analyses produced at the time, short
descriptions on the backgrounds of each principal, and a
narrative that reviews the situation in Vietnam in the six
to eight months prior to the NSC meeting. Students are
advised to develop their own policy recommendations based on
their evaluation of the evidence. The exercise stresses the
interaction of political and military factors, as well as
international and domestic influences, involved in national
security decision-making.
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CS 0698-08
CS
1099-15
THE DEVIL AND THE DEMON:
The Threat of Bioterrorism in the U.S.
William C. Banks
With the presidential election
looming, the soon-to-be outgoing administration is about to
become embroiled in armed conflict abroad. Following a
breakdown in the Middle East peace negotiations, several
Iraqi Scud missiles were launched at targets in Israel and
thousands of Iraqi troops and heavy armor have amassed at
the northwest border, near Jordan. The U.S. has deployed
air, land, and naval forces to the region and is preparing
to launch Operation Sustain Peace. Meanwhile, in the U.S.
there is considerable opposition to a large and dangerous
commitment of American lives and resources. At the same
time, various groups associated with Arab and Muslim causes
have threatened to carry out terrorist attacks against
targets in the U.S. in retaliation for U.S. involvement in
the Gulf. A crisis atmosphere has suddenly gripped the
nation. Yesterday, a vial containing live smallpox virus
particles was found in the offices of a New York newspaper.
A group with the code name “Alpha” has claimed
responsibility for the attack and has indicated its
intention of killing tens of thousands of Americans if the
U.S. commences Operation Sustain Peace.
This simulation provides a
mechanism for participants to consider the many strategic,
operational, legal, and leadership issues imbedded in
defending the U.S. homeland against attack by
non-conventional weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons (NBCs). The simulation
demonstrates the potential seriousness of the post-Cold War WMD threat, while it draws attention to the considerable
work yet to be done in homeland defense preparedness, by
DOD, the military, and others. Participants are asked to
formulate a response to a homeland defense crisis triggered
by a threatened bioweapons attack, and to adapt the response
as more information becomes available during the simulation.
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CS 1202-29
PHILANTHROPY VS. NATIONAL SECURITY:
Should CARE Criticize
the Military?
Arthur C. Brooks
Jeff Brooks creates direct-mail fundraising appeals for
charitable organizations. His specialty is overseas
humanitarian organizations—foreign aid nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). In early 2001, CARE International came
to Jeff and asked him to redesign its fundraising appeals.
Jeff has been working on the CARE account for about a year
now, and is considering some important changes to the way
the organization portrays itself in its fundraising.
Specifically, he is thinking about whether a change in
CARE’s policy of impartiality on political issues—such as
the role of the U.S. Military—might be worth reconsidering.
He is wondering about the impact of such a change. For
example, he is pondering whether an activist stance by CARE
against American military activities might have an impact on
public opinion—perhaps lowering support for military
activities—and consequently impact this country’s national
security. This case describes Jeff’s dilemma and presents
several sources of survey data on national security public
opinion and fundraising, which are intended to help
illuminate the situation.
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CS 0103-31
DAN GOLDIN’S CATCH-22:
Deploying a U.S.-Russian Space
Station
W. Henry Lambright
In 1993, President Bill Clinton directed NASA to bring
Russia into the project to build the International Space
Station (ISS). Russia thus joined the U.S., Europe, Japan,
and Canada in the largest civilian, international R&D
project in history. The decision was controversial and
complicated, as the former foe became America’s principal
partner. Moreover, the decision meant that the initial
assembly in space would unite U.S. and Russian components.
The complete International Space Station would be built
around a U.S.-Russian centerpiece. In most quarters, the
decision to unite the U.S. and Russia in space was applauded
and even seen as historic. A vocal minority warned against
putting Russia in a position where it could influence the
pace and direction of the project, making the U.S. and other
nations dependent on its actions. The man who helped sell
the concept of a U.S.-Russian partnership and then coped
with its technical and political reality was NASA
Administrator Dan Goldin. Serving from 1992 to 2001, he
cajoled, pleaded, and pressed the Russians. He had also to
deal with Congress and its criticism. Costs soared and
delays lengthened. Goldin was forced to spend money on
contingent technologies in case the Russians failed to
deliver components.
This case illuminates the role of an agency head seeking to
move a large-scale technological program forward in the face
of conflicting pressures, some of which were his own making.
This case engages readers in discussions about the ability
of an administrative leader to combine multiple values,
especially international security and domestic budget
cutting, while leading a huge and technically demanding
project. What is success in this case? What were the ends of
policy and were Goldin’s means effective? What did he do
right or wrong? Did the very goal of combining security
policy and space policy via the Space Station make sense?
How was Goldin helped and hindered by President Clinton, the
Congress, and the Russians in achieving his goals?
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CS 1102-28
HOMELAND SECURITY
James Blandin
It was 8:30 p.m., September 15, 2001. Margaret Claire, the
Deputy to the National Security Advisor, sat at her desk
looking out the window in the Old Executive Office Building.
Her life and the lives of her fellow citizens had changed
forever as a result of the events of September 11th.
A new wave of terrorism, involving new weapons, posed a
security challenge unlike any ever faced by our nation. It
was clear that the need for homeland security was not tied
to any specific terrorist threat. Instead, this need was
part of our underlying vulnerability as a society and the
uncertainty posed by our limited ability to be sure when or
where the next terrorist act would occur. Not since World
War II had our values and way of life been so threatened.
This fact made securing the homeland a national priority.
This exercise is designed to explore the relationship
between homeland security objectives, threats to homeland
security, and the structuring of governmental programs and
organization necessary to achieve homeland security.
Participants will be challenged to work through this
ends-means relationship in sequential fashion in the two
parts of the case. In Part I, participants will deal with
questions related to defining homeland security objectives,
identifying the major threats to homeland security and
finally, developing a strategy for dealing with these
threats. In Part II, participants will use the work
developed in Part I as the basis for making recommendations
on how to organize federal, state and local government to
provide homeland security.
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CS 1202-30
CHOOSING SIDES IN SOUTH ASIA:
The 1971 Crisis
Thomas A. Keaney and Hans Davies
In 1971, a simmering dispute between East and West Pakistan
boiled over into open conflict that by year’s end had led to
the partition of the country, war between India and
Pakistan, and tense confrontations both between China and
India and the Soviet Union and the United States. While the
specifics of the Pakistani dispute directly affected no U.S.
interests, nor those of the Soviet Union or China, the
dynamics of great power relationships served to engage the
United States, and the Soviets and Chinese. American
security interests, at the time directed by President
Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry
Kissinger, steered the course for the U.S. policy, but it
was not without internal conflict. Not only did Nixon and
Kissinger face opposition in Congress, but also in the
national security decision-making process they found
themselves often at odds with the leadership at both the
State and Defense Departments.
This exercise simulates two decision-making meetings of that
time, putting participants in the middle of the events of
1971 crisis. It also provides insights in the interaction of
the political and military leaders involved and the national
security decision-making environment in which they operated.
For the exercise, participants are asked to consider
themselves members of an inter-agency working group, called
at the time the Washington Special Action Group that has
been assigned the task of providing recommendations to the
President. As preparation for the meeting, participants are
provided with documents prepared at the time by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and by members of the National Security
Council staff to prepare for briefings and discussions in
these simulated meetings.
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CS 0603-32
THE PREDATOR
William C. Banks
On the first night of the campaign against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001, the United States
nearly had a major success. Officials believed that they
had pinpointed the location of supreme leader of the
Taliban, Mullah Muhammad Omar. While patrolling the roads
near Kabul, an unmanned but armed CIA drone trained its
crosshairs on Omar in a convoy of cars fleeing the capitol.
Under the terms of an agreement, the CIA controllers did not
have the authority to order a strike on the target and,
while awaiting approval for the attack, Omar escaped.
Following the near miss, no verified intelligence reported
seeing much less targeting either Omar or Usama bin Laden
during the Afghanistan campaign. Senior leaders of Al Qaeda
remained at large, and they were likely relocating early and
often to elude detection, capture, or death. However, on
November 3, 2001, a missile-carrying Predator drone killed
Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda’s chief of military operations, in a
raid near Kabul. Then, in early May 2002 the CIA tried but
failed to kill an Afghan factional leader, Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, an Islamic fundamentalist who had vowed to topple
the government of Hamid Karzai and to attack U.S. forces.
This case explores a number of issues that are central to
the present and likely future national security posture of
the United States, ranging range from host government
cooperation, collateral damage, and the locus of decision
authority, to tactical questions about the appropriate uses
of technology and weaponry. Among other issues, the case
reviews the emerging policies and procedures that permit
targeting terrorists with lethal force, explores the
evolving DOD/CIA relationship in this area, and assesses the
legal authorities for and potential limits on targeted
killing and the utility of targeted killing in the war on
terrorism.
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CS 0803-33
SQUEEZING A BALLOON:
Plan Colombia and America’s War on Drugs
Volker Franke and Justin Reed
While Americans are concerned about terrorism and the war in
Iraq, Washington has quietly intensified its war on drugs.
In particular, U.S. involvement in the Colombian civil war
has deepened, as the Bush administration has effectively
linked its war on terrorism with its efforts to combat the
influx of illegal drugs into the United States. The prime
target in America’s war on drugs is Colombia, the world’s
leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a
significant supplier of heroin to the United States.
This case chronicles half-a-century of violence in Colombia,
describes the nature and magnitude of U.S. involvement in
its bloody civil war, and explores connections between
America’s war on drugs and its more recent war on
terrorism. The case focuses specifically on the merits of
Plan Colombia, the Clinton Administration-initiated strategy
of source-country drug eradication, and the effects and
implications of the Bush Administration’s decision to
intensify previous U.S. counter-drug efforts. Questions
raised by this case include: What threats does Colombia’s
civil conflict pose to U.S. national security? How does
Plan Colombia address those threats? Is Plan Colombia
effective in achieving Washington’s counter-drug
objectives? Are drug interdiction and eradication
legitimate national security concerns? How does the war on
drugs affect the traditional roles and missions of the U.S.
military? Finally, what is the connection between America’s
drug war and its war on terrorism?
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CS 0903-34
MANAGING TRANSITION IN A POST-WAR COUNTRY
John Murray and Louis Kriesberg
In October 2001, a
U.S.-led coalition initiated a military attack on
Afghanistan to eliminate the al Qaeda terrorist headquarters
and training centers that had been responsible for the 9/11
World Trade Center/Pentagon tragedies. A secondary
objective was the removal of the Taliban government, which
had for many years provided cover for and supported Osama
bin Laden’s terrorist organization. By December 2001, the
al Qaeda and Taliban forces had been largely defeated, and
an internationally supported conference of Afghan leaders
had selected Hamid Karzai to head an Afghan Interim
Administration. Since that time Karzai has continued to
lead a struggling country as it tries to establish a stable
governing structure and goes through the process of drafting
and approving a new democratic constitution.
Participants in this exercise are assigned specific roles
and asked to participate in a meeting with the Deputy
National Security Advisor convened to develop a list of
issues involved in the current situation, generate the
principal options for U.S. reaction, review the consequences
of implementing each of those options, and agree, by
consensus if possible, on a preferred option. This exercise
attempts to accomplish three main objectives: (1) to present
innovative ideas about negotiation, facilitation, and
problem-solving skills that are useful in handling complex
national security issues; (2) to provide a crisis situation
and simulated conditions under which senior military
officers and civilian officials can apply their process
skills toward achieving the task assigned; and (3) to
generate a list of useful lessons learned for improving the
process by which senior officials approach and resolve major
national security problems.
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